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Analysis of the US Case in Climate Change Negotiations
Yoram Margalioth*

Abstract
I applaud Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach's courage in taking the academically
unpopularstand of arguing thatthe US and other developed countries are not morally required
to pay signicant amounts of money (or mone-equivalents such as emission permits) to
developing countries in the context of climate change. I believe their book may help narrow the
gap between developed and developing countries' perceptions ofjustice on this matter. I dzfer
with them in three respects. First,I think that we should acknowledge the fact that developed
countries are unwilling to transfer sgnficant amounts of money (notjust in the climate change
context) on distributivejustice grounds, and adopt a moral theory that is more consistent with
reality (but nevertheless requires signicant transfers on humanitariangrounds). Second, I find
merit in the argument that there is a moralflaw in the US's lack of smgnificant action to reduce
its relatively high per capita greenhouse gas emissions in the years after it became general
knowledge that dangerous climate change was taking place and that it was anthropogenic.
Third, I do not find the fact that developing countries will suffer the harsh consequences of
climate change before the developed countries do to give the developed countries moral or
bargainingadvantage.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach's book, Climate Change Justice
addresses the greatest obstacle to achieving global cooperation in mitigating
climate change: the conflict between developed and developing countries over
what constitutes a just allocation of costs.' Due to their inability to bridge this
divide, representatives from 200 countries that participated in the recent round
of UN climate-change negotiations in December 2011 in Durban bought some
time (though at a huge price, because delay increases mitigation costs). They
committed their governments to developing "a protocol, another legal
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force," 3 under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions as early as possible, but no later than 2015. The parties also agreed
that the new global mitigation scheme would take effect no later than 2020.4
The Durban outcome is not a significant achievement because the
problems that prevented agreement in December 2011 will prevent any future
agreement unless resolved. The agreement reached in Durban had, however, one

1
2

Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate ChangeJusice (Princeton 2010).
See, for example, Andrew Dessler and Edward A. Parson, The Science and Poltics of Climate Change:
A Guide to the Debate 188 (Cambridge 2010); Andrew Revkin, Global Warming Basics, NY Times
(Nov 23, 2009), online at http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/global-warmingbasics/ (visited Oct 11, 2012) ("At the heart of the international debate is a momentous tussle
between rich and poor countries over who steps up first and who pays most for changed energy
menus."); Graciela Chichilnisky and Kristen A. Sheeran, Saving Kyoto: An Insider's Guide to How It

Works, Why It Matters and What It Meansfor the Future 124 (New Holland 2009) ("Mhe conflict
between the rich and the poor nations is the cause of Kyoto's uncertain future."). The costs I am
referring to in this Article are the costs of mitigation, such as investments in new technologies and
infrastructure that are necessary for a transition to a low-GHG economy. The costs of transition,
in the power generation sector only, of switching from reliance on current sources of energy to
higher shares of renewable energy sources, are around 1 percent of global gross domestic product
(GDP) per year. See Ottmar Edenhofer, et al, IPCC Special Report on Renewable Enegy Sources and
Climate Change Mitigation: Summat for Podgmakers 38 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
2011), online at https://docs.google.com/file/d/OBlgFp6Ioo3akeGxneECejQxdzg/edit (visited
Oct 15, 2012). Accounting for the many other necessary changes would bring the total cost to
about 2 percent of global GDP per year over the next fifty years. See Nicholas Stem, A Blueprint
Fora Safer Planet 48 (Bodley Head 2009).

3

United Nations, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, UN Doc
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2012).

4

Id.
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important aspect: it was the first time that developing countries, most notably
China and India, agreed to subject themselves to a global GHG mitigation
scheme. This gives some hope that a future global treaty to be negotiated will be
efficient, covering the major emitters. GHG mitigation requires global action.
There is no sense in acting unilaterally. Emissions reduced by one country can
be offset by an increase in emissions elsewhere. And there will be some transfer
(known as leakage) of polluting industries to countries that are uncovered by the
global mitigation scheme, as well as some increase in consumption, in those
countries, of energy from fossil fuels due to the decreased demand for such
energy in the covered countries.
This does not imply, however, that developing countries have relinquished
their justice-based claims against developed countries. The Durban agreement
does not specify anything about the content of the new protocol. Once
negotiations begin in earnest, developing countries are likely to expect developed
countries to bear most of the economic burden of the global mitigation scheme.
This makes Climate Changejustice very timely and important.
To clarify the analysis, let us assume that all countries agree to sign and
enforce a global climate change mitigation treaty imposing a tax on GHG
emissions at a global rate that would fix GHG concentration in the atmosphere
at the optimal level.' By making this assumption, we assume away all efficiency
issues and focus on the question of justice-the subject of the book.
The question is, then, how to allocate the cost of mitigation across
countries.' Many scholars and countries' representatives in climate change
negotiations argue that the US should bear a significant share of the cost, on the
order of trillions of dollars.' Posner and Weisbach, however, argue against such
cost allocation, making the following claims:
(1) The US is not morally required, on distributive justice grounds or
because of alleged responsibility for the stock of GHG in the atmosphere due to
past emissions, to assume the costs of (or reimburse) other countries that
participate in a global climate change mitigation scheme.

5
6

7
8

The same goal could be achieved using a global cap-and-trade scheme.
Alternately, we could frame the question as: What would be the "optimal" level of GHG
concentration? Should it be the optimal level for the US, the global average, or the optimal level
for poor countries that also tend to be relatively highly vulnerable to climate change? By
assuming, in the text, that it is the global optimal level and focusing only on the allocation of
costs, we capture everything that matters and clarify the discussion.
See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Cimate Change justice, 96 Georgetown L J 1565, 1608
(2008).
See Section II for a discussion of global distributive justice and Section III for a discussion of
responsibility for past emissions.
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(2) Countries differ in their vulnerability to climate change.' In the absence
of distributive or corrective justice claims, the cost of mitigation should be
allocated according to the benefits from mitigation. The US is relatively less
vulnerable to climate change than other countries, including many developing
countries, and should therefore bear a relatively small share of the cost.
Therefore, when countries demand that the US bear a significant share of
mitigation costs as, for example, was expected of the US under the Kyoto
Protocol, they ask the US to become a net loser. International cooperation is
voluntary. Countries will not sign treaties that make them net losers,"o unless
they are ethically required to do so and choose to act morally. As claimed in (1)
above, the US is not morally required to do so.
(3) Lastly, Posner and Weisbach raise the issue of political feasibility. Even
if the US were morally required to transfer trillions of dollars to developing
countries through a climate change treaty, the US is highly unlikely to undertake
such a commitment. 1' In fact, the main reason Posner and Weisbach give for
writing their book is their concern that the justice-related arguments would
"doom the prospects for an international agreement-and thus . . . create

exceedingly serious risks to human welfare, above all in poor nations."12
I applaud Posner and Weisbach for their courage in taking this
academically unpopular stand. By doing so, they improve the chances of
reaching a global agreement, because one of the major impediments to the
success of the international negotiations on climate change is developing
countries' suspicion that climate change discussions are a "tool that the North is
using to slow the economic and political rise of the South." 3 Explaining why the
US believes it is acting morally is extremely important in creating enough trust to
reach an agreement, especially when one considers the high level of suspicions
held by developing nations. I view the book as an effort to bridge the gap
between developed and developing countries by explaining why the US views its
position as morally sound.

9

10

11

12
13

See Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change justice at 21-26 (cited in note 1).
And if they sign treaties that are not in their interest, they are unlikely to abide by them. See
Thomas Schelling, What Makes Greenhouse Sense?, 81 Foreign Aff 1, 5 (2002) ("[N]either the United
States nor the other major developed countries will likely accept serious sanctions for missing
emissions targets.").
In addition to the difficulty in raising such huge sums, the US's fear of losing its competitive
advantage to China (and later to India, a primary recipient of such transfers) would make transfers
to these countries even less politically feasible.
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 192 (cited in note 1).
Ramgopal Agarwala, Towards a Global Compact for Managing Cmate Change, in Joseph Aldy and
Robert Stavins, eds, Post-Kyoto International Clmate Polig: A Summat for Polkgmakers 75 (Cambridge
2009) (referring to the need for the South to conduct its own research on climate change).
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While I support Posner and Weisbach's project, I differ with them in three
respects. First, while I agree with Posner and Weisbach that the US need not
engage in distributive justice via a climate change treaty, I think there is a better
way to support this view, a way that is more likely to be found credible by
developing countries. Posner and Weisbach apply a welfarist analysis to the
global context, arguing that redistribution should take the form of foreign aid
and not of a redistributive climate change treaty. This is analytically accurate, but
is likely to frustrate developing countries and decrease the chance of
cooperation, because foreign aid is insignificant.14 And there is no reason to
think that rich countries will significantly increase the amounts they transfer to
poor countries in the form of foreign aid-especially now and in the foreseeable
future, due to the great uncertainty that many of these countries are experiencing
regarding their future since the 2008-09 economic crisis. Thus, when Posner
and Weisbach say that they believe that borders are meaningless for
redistribution purposes, but refuse to engage in redistribution in the context of a
global treaty that is currently on the table, developing countries may find the
argument dishonest.
Therefore, in the setting of real-world negotiations, it is imperative to get
to the bottom of the global distributive justice question and to try to find a
theory that we can honestly live by. Rawls's global distributive justice theory"
seems closer to reality, and I think that developing countries would find the US
position more candid and easier to agree with if the US based the morality of its
position on such a theory. I suspect that even people in poor countries, the
intended beneficiaries of global transfers, would not agree to pay taxes to fund
transfers to poorer countries, based on an alleged global distributive justice
theory. This does not mean that rich countries should not transfer any resources
to poor countries. Of course they should. But such transfers are required on a
humanitarian basis, to help developing countries cope with various disasters,

14

See, for example, Wojciech Kopczuk, Joel Slemrod, and Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Limitations of
Decentralqed World Redistribution: An Optimal Taxation Approach, 49 Eur Econ Rev 1051, 1075
(2005) ("Mhe actual flow of foreign aid is minuscule compared to what the optimal world
income tax implies, suggesting that voluntary world redistribution produces an outcome that is
consistent with the residents of rich countries not being border-neutral, or anything close to it, or
with assuming that most of the aid will be wasted."); Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Povery 310 (Penguin
2005) ("Contrary to popular perception, the amount of aid per African per year is really very
small, just $30 per sub-Saharan African in 2002, from the entire world.... In 2002, the US gave
$3 per sub-Saharan African. Taking out the parts for US consultants, food and other emergency
aid, administrative costs, and debt relief, the aid per African came to the grand total of six
cents.').

15

See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard 1999) (rejecting the idea of an indefinite international
redistribution duty and the global application of his difference principle).
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including the need to adapt to the inevitable consequences of climate change,
not on distributive justice grounds.
Second, unlike Posner and Weisbach, I find merit in the argument that
there is a moral flaw in the US's lack of significant action to reduce its relatively
high per capita GHG emissions in the years after it became general knowledge
that dangerous climate change was taking place and that it was anthropogenic.
For example, the US imposes relatively low taxes on fossil fuel-based energy,
while its emissions per capita are about twice the per capita emissions in Western
Europe, though the standard of living is similar."
Finally, Posner and Weisbach assign much weight to their argument that
because countries differ in their vulnerability to climate change, compensation
should be paid by countries that benefit more from climate change mitigation to
countries that benefit less, to make the global agreement equally attractive to
everyone. Indeed, once we eliminate considerations of distributive justice and
responsibility for past emissions, all we are left with is straightforward
bargaining, with each country morally free to make its own cost-benefit analysis.
Posner and Weisbach think that in theory, this would require other
countries to compensate the US for participating in a global mitigation scheme
because the US is relatively less vulnerable. This may be interpreted as a moral
argument or as an argument about power in negotiations." I am not sure,
however, that the US is indeed less vulnerable to climate change than developing
countries. The US's vulnerability depends on what is expected to happen if the
US refuses to participate in the global scheme. It is plausible to assume that no
global coalition (nor, probably, leadership) would form in the absence of US
participation, as China, India, and many other high-emitting countries are
unlikely to limit their emissions unless the US does so. Under such a "business
as usual" scenario, the US is expected to suffer losses due to climate change that
are larger in monetary terms than those suffered by poorer countries." This will
16

17
18

See, for example, the World Bank Data, online at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.
ATM.CO2E.PC (visited Oct 13, 2012); The Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric
Research (EDGAR), What's New?, online at http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu (visited Oct 13, 2012);
Jos G.J. Oliver, Greet Janssens-Maenhout, and Jeroen A.H.W. Peters, Trends in Global CO2
at
online
2012),
Centre
Research
Joint
Commission
(European
Emissions
http://edgar.rc.ec.europa.eu/CO2REPORT2012.pdf (visited Oct 10, 2012). Some of the
difference can be explained by the greater distances that Americans need to drive on a daily basis
compared to Europeans. But I doubt if this alone can explain the entire difference in emissions
per capita.
See Posner and Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice at 96-97 (cited in note 1).
Poor countries bear a larger burden as a fraction of their GDP than rich countries, but the
relevant question to be considered is that of comparing the costs of GHG abatement with the
benefits expected to derive from averting the climate change problem. The costs and benefits are
measured in dollars, not in relative shares of GDP. Rich countries have more to lose, because
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happen later; that is, developing countries will be the first to suffer from climate
change, but ultimately we must acknowledge that the greater losses that the US
will suffer have a weakening effect on its current negotiating power.
In Section II, I discuss global distributive justice. Section III addresses the
question of responsibility for past emissions. In Section IV, I examine the
meaning of differences in vulnerability to climate change in terms of bargaining
power and from a moral perspective. Finally, I conclude.
II. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
When analyzing global distributive justice, Posner and Weisbach argue that
redistribution from rich to poor should be based on the relative overall wellbeing of the poor and not on only one specific factor." Climate change is one of
many factors that affect a nation's wealth. Some poor countries that will incur
significant adaptation costs will nevertheless be wealthier than other poor
countries with lower climate change-related costs. The latter should be addressed
first because what we care about is redistribution from rich to poor, whereas
vulnerability to climate change is merely an (inaccurate) proxy for poverty.21
In addition, assuming economic growth, the current residents of some
poor nations may be poorer than the future residents of those nations will be,
even when the future impact of climate change on these countries is taken into
account. Moreover, cash transfers are generally preferable, because they allow
recipients to use the money as they see fit. The poor country may prefer, for
example, to spend the money on education, or on AIDS prevention, or on
health care in general, for the benefit of its residents.
I agree with the above welfarist analysis. There is no reason to base climate
change policy on redistributive motivation, because climate change mitigation
and adaptation costs do not add any relevant information for redistribution
purposes that was not already captured in the countries' wealth. I therefore agree
that redistribution through money transfers is superior to redistribution through
a climate change treaty.

19

they have more income flows and assets to protect. Take, for example, Hurricane Katrina, which
resulted in costs due to property damage of more than $100 billion. Similar disasters taking place
in areas of the world where property is less valuable result in lower damage measured in monetary
terms. To clarify this point, assume that climate change results in the complete destruction of
Earth. Under such a scenario, rich countries will suffer greater losses of income than poor
countries, simply because they had more to lose. Hence, logically, there must be a point, that is, a
level of GHG concentration in the atmosphere, lower than the one that leads to the complete
destruction of earth, where the benefits to the rich countries from climate change abatement are
greater than the benefits to poor countries.
See Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Jusice at 97 (cited in note 1).

20

Id.
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There is, however, one problem with this theory: its application. Wealthy
countries refuse to provide foreign aid in significant amounts.2' Negotiations
over a climate treaty may provide an opportunity to put pressure on rich
countries to transfer funds to poor countries. Posner and Weisbach reject this
argument, raising the concern that it may doom the climate change
negotiations. 22 This is not a moral argument, but a practical and empirical one.
I therefore suggest that we try to understand why we think (actually, know)
that the US and other rich countries will refuse to transfer hundreds of billions
of dollars to poor countries, even though, within each country, significant
transfers from rich to poor individuals take place. The reason rich countries are
unlikely to agree to significant transfers to poor countries through climate
change treaties, or otherwise, is their disbelief in global distributive justice as a
guiding norm.
I think that Rawls's global distributive justice theory better describes
reality. 23 According to Rawls, distributive justice applies only to fellow members
of a society under one sovereign government. 24 People who are subject to the
same government and are forced to obey its laws are loyal to a shared political
order and support the same institutions. Their loyalty is based on trust that the
concern for all compatriots' well-being is the rationale for all political choices.
People living in different countries are not subject to a joint coercive authority
and therefore are not morally entitled to its provisions. Globalization does not
change this, as it merely creates economic interdependence across countries,
which is not enough to make people in different countries become part of a
unified society. 25
Most people do not rely on welfarism in shaping their moral views of
global distributive justice. Adopting moral theories by whose standards nearly
everyone is immoral seems to me to be unwarranted. As mentioned in the
introduction, I think that even the people in poor countries, the intended
beneficiaries of global transfers, would not agree to pay taxes to fund transfers
to poorer countries based on an alleged global distributive justice theory. In my
view, wealthy countries should help poor countries to finance the huge costs of
adaptation, as preventive action is often more cost-effective than emergency
action, and poor countries lack the necessary resources. But this is justified on a
humanitarian basis, not on distributive justice grounds.

21

See note 14.

22

See Posner and Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice at 192 (cited in note 1).

23

See Rawls, The Law of Peoples (cited in note 15).

24

Id.

25

Richard W. Miller, Globahijngjustice: The Ethics of Povery and Power 46 (Oxford 2010).
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Developing countries often try to avoid the difficult question of
distributive justice by stressing the intuitive appeal of an equal per capita
26
allocation of global emission permits, viewing it as a guiding norm. They argue
that in an international agreement, emission rights should be allocated by
reference to population. This would generally redistribute wealth from
developed to developing countries, as developing countries (who tend to be low
per capita emitters) would be able to sell their excessive permits to developed
countries (who tend to be high per capita emitters).
I agree with Posner and Weisbach that equal per capita GHGs should not
be regarded as a guiding norm. The equal per capita argument is baseless. It is
predicated on the assumption that the "atmosphere" belongs to all human
beings equally. But assuming ownership is simply begging the question. We
could have reached an opposite conclusion by making a different assumption;
for example, that the atmosphere belongs to no one, hence people are free to
emit on a first-come, first-served basis. Saying this would provide moral
justification for the current unequal use. Therefore, we need a general theory,
such as a distributive justice theory, to decide what would be a fair allocation.
III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAST EMISSIONS
The main arguments Posner and Weisbach raise against assigning
responsibility for past emissions are the following: (1) the immorality of
assigning collective responsibility; (2) the need for fault and therefore an ability
to know that the activity is harmful; and (3) the need for negligence.27
A. Collective Responsibility
When developing countries request compensation from developed
countries due to the latter's excessive emissions that contributed
disproportionately to the stock of GHG in the atmosphere, they rely on tort law.
The tort claim is directed at a country and thereby to all individuals who
currently reside in it; but those individuals may differ sharply in their GHG
emissions. Some individuals may have consumed relatively little electricity and
never owned a vehicle, while others emitted a lot. Posner and Weisbach argue
that such a tort claim, that is, a claim against an aggregated defendant that
includes individuals who did nothing wrong, is immoral.2 8

26

See, for example, the long list of references in Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 120
(cited in note 1).

27

See id at 102-16.

28

See id at 101.
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I do not find this argument convincing. Under the tort claim, if successful,
the state will be required to pay compensation. This will be paid from revenues
raised by its tax system. It is the government's responsibility toward its residents
to tax its citizens according to each individual's emissions. In the likely case that
the government did not do so, it is the government's fault that it did not impose
taxes on GHG emissions. Citizens can raise claims against their own
government for not making people pay for the real cost of their activities, but
they cannot raise claims against other countries that request compensation based
on the harm that was caused to them.
B. Culpability
The US position on climate change has been criticized for years by scholars
and international forums.29 The two principal criticisms are the US's rejection of
the Kyoto framework and its lack of action to reduce GHG emissions
domestically.
The first criticism is less relevant today. At the time, the US's refusal to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol3 0 unless developing countries committed to limit their
GHG emissions seemed extreme. Today, we understand that without universal
coverage, a global mitigation scheme would be prohibitively costly, if not
completely futile.3 1 Moreover, when viewed in retrospect, the burden the
protocol imposed on the US was disproportionately heavy. Some nations, such
as Russia, Germany, and the UK, met their commitments thanks to historical
events unrelated to the need to reduce GHG emissions, 2 and others, most
notably Canada, failed to meet their commitments. In 2012, Canada, Japan, and
Russia adopted the US position and refused to be part of the protocol unless
developing countries committed to limiting their emissions as well.
The second criticism of the US remains valid. It may even be stronger in
light of the Senate's negative position on the cap-and-trade bill that was passed
by the House in 2009. The US continues to be among the world's top emitters
29

See, for example, Steven Kull, et al, America's Global Image in the Obama Era 4 (The Program on
International Policy Attitudes 2009), online at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf
/jul09/WPOUSObamaJulO9_packet.pdf (visited Oct 14, 2012).

30

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997), 37
ILM 22 (1998).
See Joshua Elliott, et al, UnilateralCarbon Taxes, BorderAdjustments and Carbon Ieakage (The Center
for Robust Decision Making on Climate and Energy Policy Working Paper, Feb 2012), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1995888#%23 (visited Oct 10, 2012).
See Dessler and Parson, The Science and Politics of Climate Change at 25 (cited in note 2) ("Russia, for

31

32

example, met the target because of the collapse of the Soviet economy after 1990, Germany
because it absorbed the shrinking East German economy, and Britain because it privatized
electrical generation and cut coal production.").
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on a per capita basis and no federal carbon tax or cap-and-trade system is likely
to be adopted in the foreseeable future.
This brings up the question of fault. Adjusted for population size, the US
contributes more to climate change than most other countries, and may be
morally required to pay compensation for its excessive emissions in the past.
Once we require fault, there is a very strong fairness-based case to limiting tort
claims to emissions that took place only in recent years. The reason is simple.
Until relatively recently, developed countries were not (and could not have been)
aware of the effects of GHG emissions, and so should not be held accountable
for past emissions. Setting the cut-off date is an empirical question.
It could be 1992, because in that year, nearly all countries, including the
US, signed an international treaty-the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)-" [for] stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system." Alternately, it could be as
recently as 2010, when all major economies agreed on the goal of limiting
warming to less than 20 C above preindustrial levels. 34
Compensation should be reduced to account for the benefits that low per
capita emitting countries derived through positive spillovers from economic
activity (such as innovation) that took place in polluting countries, if such
activity was made possible thanks to high per capita emissions.
To sum up, as has been mentioned above, GHG mitigation requires global
action. There is no sense in acting unilaterally. Therefore, the US and other high
per capita emitters are responsible for not doing enough to decrease their
emissions and should pay some compensation for excessive emissions that took
place after a certain cut-off date. But in calculating the compensation, positive
spillovers should be accounted for, as well as the contributory fault of many
other countries, including the major developing countries, to the failure to reach
a global mitigation scheme because such a scheme would have reduced the
emissions in developed countries.

33

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), 1771 UN Treaty Ser 107
(1994).

3

United Nations, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, UN Doc
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011) (". . . with a view to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions
so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 20 C above preindustrial levels.").
See Yoram Margalioth, Taxing Multinationals:Polcy Anasis with a Focus on Technologv, Brit Tax Rev
99 (2011) (analyzing the importance of positive spillovers across borders for global, as well as
national, social welfare).

35
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C. Negligence
Posner and Weisbach argue that the weakest standard of culpability is
negligence; 6 therefore, if the US was not negligent in emitting GHGs, no suit
can be brought against it. They argue that on the individual level, a GHG
emitting activity cannot be regarded as negligent if the benefit the individual
derived from the activity was greater than what she would have been required to
pay under a carbon tax regime, had such a system been in place. Assuming that a
carbon tax would have added ten cents to the price of a gallon of gas, Posner
and Weisbach argue that "a person is negligent when she drives rather than
walks if the benefit she obtains from driving is less than ten cents per gallon
consumed. The argument could be extended to the choice of driving rather than
using convenient forms of public transportation and to other activities as well."
This, essentially, is another version of the collective responsibility
argument. This time the "collective" is comprised of the separate acts performed
by the same individual. I think the argument is wrong, because it is based on the
assumption that the carbon tax, which is a Pigouvian tax, namely a tax that is
designed to change individuals' behavior, did not work. If indeed adding ten
cents to the price of a gallon of gas has no effect at all, the tax is too low.
Plausibly assuming that a tax set at the optimal rate would change many
individuals' behavior, some US individuals would change their behavior, hence
the tax represents the group's negligence, measured collectively. It can therefore
be arbitrarily attributed to the individuals who form the group.
Posner and Weisbach also argue:
If many or most people fail to pay a carbon tax or (as we argue) fail to act as
if they pay it by cutting back on less important activities that produce
greenhouse gases, then the contribution of Americans who do this is quite
small. And if this is the case, it cannot be considered negligent for
Americans to fail to reduce their greenhouse gas emitting activities. Put
differently, it is not negligent to fail to contribute to a public good if not
enough others are doing similarly, so that the public good would not be
created even if one did contribute.38
I do not find this argument convincing. First, the underlying assumption
that climate change is an all-or-nothing phenomenon is wrong. If the public
good is not "created," or, if dangerous climate change is taking place, any
additional emissions increase the harm. This is not equivalent to the case
(analyzed by philosophers, as will be described below) where many people kill a
person together, each contributing a little to the killing, and some of them,
36
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unknowingly, do so after the person is already dead. The earth is not dead yet, so
adding excessive emissions is morally wrong.
Even assuming that the emissions were so severe that nothing could be
done to save the planet, this behavior would have been negligent according to
the following classic statement by Derek Parfit: "Even if an act harms no one,
this act may be wrong because it is one of a set of acts that together harm other
people."39 In the case of a jointly harmful act, the order in which the agents
contribute to that harm is irrelevant in the moral assessment of the agents'
behavior. The American individuals who emit beyond their baseline per capita
emissions contribute to the harm, together with all other individuals in the world
who exceed their per capita level. Each one of them is morally liable.
Lastly, Posner and Weisbach discuss the corrective justice case against
actions taken by the government. 40 They make the same points about negligence
and culpability mentioned above in the context of individuals, and I think the
same answers apply to the government context. The US government is morally
at fault, together with many other governments, for taking part in the harmful
activity. It is also negligent, even though US emissions per dollar of GDP are
relatively low. 4 ' To see that the US did not fully internalize the costs (in terms of
climate change) associated with its policy, we can make the plausible assumption
that the imposition of an optimal carbon tax would have reduced American
GHG emissions.
To sum up, both individuals and the US government, and all other high per
capita GHG emitters, are morally responsible for not taking significant action to
reduce their high per capita emissions in recent years, say, since 1992. They
should therefore compensate the rest of the world by, for example, transferring
more than their otherwise fair share of foreign aid to poor countries that are
expected to suffer grave consequences due to the already inevitable level of
climate change.
IV. DIFFERENTIAL VULNERABILITY
Countries differ in their vulnerability to climate change. There is global
consensus about the need to hold "the increase in global average temperature
below 20 C above preindustrial levels."42 The 2 0 C target is a global average. For
some countries, such as the Maldives, it is too high, because they may be flooded
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before we reach that point, but for others, possibly the US, it may be too low,
depending on the costs of mitigation. In general, developing countries are more
vulnerable to climate change than developed countries.4 3
A developed country like the US may argue that, in the absence of a
distributive justice motivation (which we ruled out), equity demands that
individuals contribute to the financing of a public good in relation to the benefit
they are expected to derive from it. The same is true for countries with respect
to the global pubic good of GHG mitigation. Those who benefit more than
others are required to contribute more, and vice versa." In other words, rich
countries can argue that they deserve a greater allocation of emission rights than
poor countries, or that they should participate in a carbon tax scheme but
receive transfer payments, because they will not benefit as much as poor
countries from climate change mitigation.45
This, however, is not the whole picture. The argument would have been
morally sound had the US not contributed to the creation of the problem by
emitting GHGs. But it did, and still does. This makes it an argument about
power in negotiations, not a moral argument. By making this argument, the US
exploits its relative power or, in other words, the greater climate change
vulnerability of the other parties to the negotiations.
I will clarify the two facets of the argument through the following example,
which I have used elsewhere. Let us imagine two prisoners sitting in their cell,
eating and talking. Next to them there is a waste basket containing some food
leftovers that smell terrible. Prisoner A cannot stand the smell. He suffers
terribly. Prisoner B, on the other hand, has lost most of his ability to smell and
therefore does not suffer much. The basket is heavy and moving it out of the
cell would require a huge effort if carried by one person, and considerable, but
nevertheless less effort, if carried by two. Prisoner A asks Prisoner B to help him
carry the basket, and prisoner B refuses, saying he hardly smells anything. At this
point, Prisoner B's refusal can be considered moral (barring distributive justice).
He has little to gain and a lot to lose because the basket is heavy. However, if we
assume that Prisoner B is responsible for much of the garbage, then his refusal
to help carry the basket becomes immoral, and if he asks Prisoner A to pay him
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to help carry the basket, B would be taking advantage of his comparative power
in a negotiation.
In the above example, Prisoner B has a bargaining advantage. He does not
suffer from the foul smell. Posner and Weisbach view the greater vulnerability of
developing countries to climate change as weakening their bargaining power in
international negotiations on the allocation of GHG mitigation costs. They
write, "[i]f climate change is to be addressed at a cost acceptable to people living
in developed countries and the major developing countries, large-scale
redistribution to the poor is not going to be part of a climate treaty."' This is
because of their International Paretianism principle, which states that no
agreement will be reached unless all states believe themselves "better off by their
lights as a result of the climate treaty."47 The principle is obviously true, but does
not mean that the US (and all other rich countries) are not better off (by their
own lights) paying vast amounts to developing countries, if the alternative is no
international cooperation to mitigate climate change.
To reach the level of atmospheric GHG concentration that is now believed
to be reasonably safe for developed countries (namely, is likely to result in only a
modest increase in average global temperature) would require near universal
participation. An increase in temperature above moderate levels, which is the
likely outcome of a failure to reach international cooperation, will result in grave
consequences to developed countries. Their losses, measured in monetary terms,
will be much greater than those of developing countries.4 8
If no global climate change mitigation scheme is agreed upon and
enforced, GHG emissions would continue unabated, and the present value of
losses that the developed countries are expected to suffer would be greater than
the transfer payments that developing countries currently require them to pay. In
other words, the US would be better off subsidizing the mitigation cost of
developing countries, because the alternative is no mitigation at all, and this
would result in even greater losses (in present value terms) to the US than the
costs (in present value terms) of mitigation.
The US and other developed countries have a timing advantage. The
developing countries will start suffering earlier. This alone could give the
46
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developed countries a significant bargaining advantage. 49 However, there is
another fact to consider: any delay in implementing the global mitigation scheme
significantly raises the costs of mitigation. Thus, the US may not benefit from its
ability to wait, because waiting also increases the costs of mitigation.
Ultimately, it is unclear whether Posner and Weisbach are correct in
assuming that the greater vulnerability of developing countries to climate change
provides the US and other developed countries with a bargaining advantage. As
for the question of morality, it seems to depend on whether we view the US as
liable for contributing to the creation of the problem. If we do, then the US
cannot argue that it is not morally required to pay for mitigation that prevents
temperature increase at levels that are beneficial to developing countries but are
excessive when examined, using a cost-benefit analysis, from the US perspective
alone.
V. CONCLUSION
Nearly all scholars view the US position in international negotiations on
climate change as morally wrong." In contrast, Posner and Weisbach defend the
morality of the US position and that of most other developed countries. By
doing so, they provide developing countries with an opportunity to see that the
US position on climate change is not necessarily based on fear of competition or
on disregard for the welfare of people in the developing world.
This is very important because we know from experiments, such as the
Ultimatum Game, that people are willing to incur significant costs to punish
people who they think treated them unfairly." Developing countries might be
willing to suffer the harsh consequences of climate change that could have been
avoided if a global climate change mitigation scheme had been employed, merely
to punish the developed countries for treating them unfairly, even if the global
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mitigation scheme would have left them better off in an objective (cost-benefit
analysis) sense.
While developing countries are unlikely to be convinced by the arguments
made in this book, the chances of reaching agreement are nonetheless improved
by the discussion the book offers. The reason is simple. It is easier to reach
cooperation when there is an honest disagreement on how to allocate costs than
it is when one party thinks that the other is treating him unfairly simply because
it believes it can.
In this paper, I have made three arguments regarding how these costs
should indeed be allocated. First, I agree with Posner and Weisbach that the
claim raised by developing countries that rich countries should take upon
themselves the financing of climate change mitigation merely because they are
rich should be rejected. But while I agree with their welfarist analysis, I think
that it would be more realistic, and more credible to developing countries, to
analyze global distributive justice according to Rawls's theory.
Second, the US and a few other high per capita GHG emitting countries
may be liable under tort law, at least in a moral sense, for their excessive
contribution to the stock of GHG in the atmosphere in recent years. The cutoff
date may be 1992, but could be later. The amount of compensation should be
adjusted for positive spillovers and should take into account the contributory
fault of other countries, including the major developing countries, to the failure
to reach a global mitigation system.
Finally, I question the argument that because developing countries are
more vulnerable to climate change developed countries have an advantage in
bargaining power. The alternative of no mitigation at all results in losses to the
US that are higher in present value monetary terms than the losses expected to
be incurred by developing countries. From a moral perspective, the US may not
be morally liable to pay for levels of mitigation beyond what is required under its
own cost-benefit analysis. But, if we see the US as a significant contributor, in
recent years, to the creation of the problem, it may be morally liable to pay for
mitigation levels beyond what is optimal from the US perspective alone.
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